At a Glance
Company
Anonymised
B2B SaaS
Challenge
Growth collapsed from 63% to 12% in about six months, then stalled for a year; replacing the sales team twice changed nothing while the burn multiple sat at 4.1.
Key insight
The decline was a product-market fit problem, not sales execution: pricing, packaging, self-service and segmentation had all drifted out of fit as the market shifted.
Approach
A product-market fit diagnosis led to several quarterly sprints over 15 months that rebuilt the offering, pricing, go-to-market and customer journey.
Results
ARR grew 51% to CHF 4.8M in a year · burn multiple down from 4.1 to 1.7 · revenue per employee up 94% · average contract value from CHF 6'500 to over CHF 9'000.
Full Story
A market slump reversed by rebuilding product-market fit, not by fixing sales again.
The board meeting nobody wanted
The CEO looked at the Q3 numbers. Growth rate was still stagnant around 12%. A year earlier it had been 63%. The burn multiple sat at 4.1, and investors asked questions and weren't satisfied with the answers.
They had tried everything. Lead generation agencies. Sales enablement programmes. They had replaced members of the sales team twice. Nothing stopped the decline.
One sales rep finally said it plainly:
It has become very hard to sell these packages and the price is too low.
Fast growth, then friction
The growth trajectory: fast pandemic-era growth, then product-market fit eroded and growth fell to 12%, then a systematic rebuild returned the company to 51% ARR growth.
During the pandemic, everything worked. Teams relied on technology, and demand was high because of the lockdown. The company rode the shift to remote work to growth rates of 80% in some quarters.
Then the economy shifted. Interest rates rose, tech budgets tightened, and remote work became either the new normal or a return-to-office policy. The company's pivot attempts consumed months of internal focus but delivered no change. Product-market fit, once strong, began to erode quietly as leaders became increasingly busy with internal transformation. Win rates dropped. Sales cycles lengthened. The pipeline filled with deals that never closed.
The real problem wasn't sales execution
When we ran the initial product-market fit diagnosis and used the PMF-Engine to assess the market situation, the gaps became clear within weeks.
Pricing was too low for the value delivered. Customers would have paid more. The company was not asking.
The offering was too rigid. Competitors offered flexible monthly plans while this company locked customers into annual contracts. When a team did not need the solution for a few months, they still paid full price.
Self-service did not exist. Small teams wanted the product on an ad hoc basis. Every deal, even small ones, required a sales call and contract. Reps spent time on low-value deals while high-value accounts waited.
Priorities were unclear. Sales chased any deal. Product built whatever customers asked for, without knowing which segments mattered most. So many segments had worked in the past that nobody agreed on which to prioritise now.
Delivery was misaligned. Customer touchpoints, handovers, and responsibilities were unclear, and teams worked around disconnected processes.
The diagnosis showed gaps across all dimensions of Customer (target personas), Offering (pricing and self-service), Channel (go-to-market) and Company (business model). This was not a sales problem. It was a product-market fit problem.
The work: PMF-Engineering over 15 months
The teams worked under our facilitation and with our PMF-Engine to identify root causes and set cross-functional OKRs. Then they moved through strategic positioning, market validation and commercial planning to execute an offering redesign, new product plans, and implement a new customer journey to return to customer-centricity.
The diagnosis and validation only took a few weeks. Redesigning the packaging and pricing took 6-9 months. The final enablement and transition took six months before results began to show.
What changed:
Pricing and packaging were redesigned. New plans matched what each persona actually needed, and higher prices reflected real value. Average contract value rose from CHF 6'500 to over CHF 9'000.
Product-led growth launched. Self-service went live for smaller customers, who could start, pause, and resume monthly plans as needed. No sales calls for low-value deals. Sales focused on accounts worth CHF 15'000 and above.
Customer experience was mapped by segment. Touchpoints were redesigned across tiers, handovers between teams were clarified, and responsibilities were aligned. We rebuilt processes that had grown organically with intention.
Segmentation sharpened. Features were matched to specific personas. No more one-size-fits-all.
Chief Product Officer: Self-service with product-led growth became our fastest-growing product line, with the best margins.
The sales team felt the difference quickly: the new product, service, and pricing plans matched customer demand far better, and they closed higher-value deals. The team executed everything themselves and built internal capability, rather than depending on consultants.
This wasn't easy
The transition required significant change across the organisation. Product plans changed. Pricing changed. Sales motions changed. Customer success and service workflows changed.
Some team members resisted, and some were upset. Raising prices for existing customers felt risky. Moving small accounts to self-service meant losing commission on those deals. A few talented people left because not everyone wanted to work differently than they had for years. That was hard.
The migration challenge
Existing customers had to move to the new structure, and you cannot flip a switch on pricing and packaging overnight. Old plans had to be decommissioned for operational efficiency, but customer migration was complex, and some customers would pay more than before.
Pushback came, so communication was critical. The team prepared for every eventuality and every difficult conversation. They explained the value, showed customers what they gained, and offered transition options. The technical migration was complex too, so the team brought in a specialist to configure the new sales-led and customer-success-led motions in their CRM.
The turning point
Six months in, the new financial results arrived. The hard decisions had been the right ones.
The results, year over year:
Client results across the engagement: net revenue retention +127%, ARR +51%, customer acquisition cost -36%, burn multiple -42%, customer retention +4%, and revenue per employee +94%, organised around customer-centricity, effective operations, and scalable growth.
What made the difference
Not fixing sales. Not replacing people. Not running more lead generation campaigns.
The difference came from looking at the entire ecosystem: who you serve, what they need, how you package value, what you charge, and how they buy.
When product-market fit slips, execution fixes will not save you. You have to diagnose why the fit weakened and rebuild it systematically across people, processes and offerings. That is harder than hiring a sales trainer. It is also what actually works.
Chris (Facilitator): As in sports, you win by executing as one unit, from goaltending to offense.
Facing a similar situation?
About this story
Published:
21. Februar 2025
Company Name:
Anonymised
B2B SaaS
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